As seen in the History Time Line, the 697th Engineer Petroleum Distribution Company was In-activated prior to the Korean Conflict and not Re-activated until after it ended.

However the 3rd Platoon of the 697th Engineer Company (Pipeline) did perform missions at Kunsan and Osan, Korea during the Viet Nam Conflict time frame (1968).

Below is the After Action Report from those missions as written by 1LT John A. Stockman, 3rd Platoon Leader. We are still trying to establish names of the enlisted personnel that accompanied 1LT Stockman from the hot wet rice patties of Thailand to the freezing wet rice patties of Korea.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
697TH ENGINEER COMPANY (PIPELINE)
(CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT)
APO San Francisco 96233

SUBJECT: After Action Report to the POL Pipeline Project in Kunsan and Osan in Korea

Commanding 0fficer
44th Engr Gp (Const)
ATTN: THCON-OP
APO 96233

1.   On or about 3 February 1968 the 697th Engineer Company (Pipeline) was alerted to prepare a full TO&E platoon to leave the theater of operation. A new platoon of forty-three (43) enlisted men and one (1) officer was formed. The personnel making up the platoon were men of sixty (60) days or more service left in Thailand. To fill a full strength platoon, it was necessary to take men from various slots in the company leaving a critical shortage of manpower in the company.

       a.   Around the clock operation was initiated to process vehicles, tools, and men. On or about 28 February 1968, a message was received stating that all TO&E equipment minus vehicles would be taken.

       b.    On 4 March 1968 two (2) Non-commissioned Officers and three (3) Enlisted Men departed from Korat Air Force base, as the advance party. The remaining personnel of thirty-eight (38) Enlisted Men and one (1) Officer departed from Korat Air Force Base on 6 March 1968 and arrived at Kunsan Air Force Base, Korea at 0200 hours 7 March 1968. After approximately thirty (30) minutes of waiting, 44th Engineer Group (Construction), Executive Officer arrived to receive the platoon. The men were then taken to a 'Tent Village."

       (1)    The Medium GP Tent with Army cots and sleeping bags were utilized for the Enlisted Men's billeting for the duration of the Kunsan Project.

       (2)    Housing was critical on this base due to the rapid build-up throughout Korea at this period of time.

2.    The mission of the Kunsan Project was the installation of approximately seven (7) miles (36,960 feet) of six (6) inch coupled, light-weight victaulic pipe and approximately 4,600 feet of heavy duty buried, welded pipe.

      a.    Much concern and interest was placed on this project. The immediate build-up of U. S. Forces in Korea because of increased North Korean threats resulted in a critical problem of rapid jet petroleum transportation from the receiving terminal to the U. S. Air Base fuel storage area.

      b.    The receiving terminal, approximately eight (8) miles from the U. S. Air Base, received the fuel by ship. From the terminal the jet petroleum would be pumped into railroad tankers and shipped to various U.S. Air Bases in the immediate area. The increase in fuel demands could not be filled under their present installation. A six (6) inch pipeline to Kunsan Air Base  was constructed to alleviate the time necessary to rail fuel into the U.S. Air Base.

3.    The immediate change from a tropical climate to a frigid climate imposed health problems to the troops. The metabolism of the men was adjusted to adverse heat conditions. The men made a rapid relocation where there was a temperature differential as great as seventy (70) degrees at various times. Greater than 70 per cent of the troops at one time or another went on sick call for either sore throats or severe head colds, resulting in a high loss of man power.

      a.    The winter issue of clothing was made the following day of arrival in Kunsan.

      (1)    Issue consisted of: One (1) field jacket, without the liner; and two (2) sets of OG shirts and pants.

      (2)    Numerous troops requested woolen underwear, however, S4 of the 44th Bn, stated that they were not obtainable at the present time. Several men purchased their own woolen underwear through the local base exchange.

      b.    A request for work gloves and rubber boots was also forwarded to the 44th Bn's S4.

      (1)    Approximately two (2) weeks, from the date of the request, the men received the work gloves.

      (2)    The rubber boots were not obtainable.

      a.    Rubber boots were requested because several of areas of the route of the pipeline were in rice fields that were flooded at times.

      b.    Troops on various occasions had to work in the icy water resulting in wet feet, which attributed to the high rate of sore throats and head colds.

4.    The job directive for the eight (8) mile pipeline, Kunsan, was assigned to Company C of the 44th Engr Const Bn, Headquarters located at Camp Carroll, Waegon, Korea. The third platoon of the 697th Engineer Company (Pipeline), Headquarters located at Camp USARTHAI, Korat, Thailand, was attached to Company C for administrative and operational control. Company C furnished all the vehicles for the project.

      a.    The vehicles consisted of one (1) jeep (for the use of the 697th platoon leader), three (3) five-ton dump trucks (for each of the squads in the 697th's third platoon), and one (1) lowbed and tractor for the transportation of the pipe to the installation site.

      b.    Adequate vehicles were available to the 697th for the project.

      c.    The 44th furnished one (1) platoon for the project. The 44th platoon was utilized in assisting in the installation of culverts for road crossings; the coating of the welded pipe with tar; and the digging of the trench for the buried pipeline.

      d.    Company C also installed approximately one-and-a-half (1 1/2) miles of tactical coupled pipe, receiving technical assistance from the 697th.

5.    The 697th pipeline Company was called upon to send a full strength platoon from Thailand to Korea to assist in what was considered a highly specialized job, however, it is felt that the attached command and higher headquarters did not fully realize that the 697th platoon was quite familiar from past experience with the installation of tactical pipe. At the commencement of the project the 44th Bn caused unnecessary chaos by not working with the pipeline officer and giving him credit that he had experienced knowledge in this type of work. The project officer was a 2LT from Company C who had never seen the installation of tactical pipe prior to this day. The Company C project officer failed to realize what was critical in the installation phase, several misunderstanding between the 697th platoon leader and the pipeline project officer resulted. The project officer and his sergeant would reassign various jobs to the pipeline platoon after the 697th platoon leader would have them assigned to a specific detail, this caused much confusion among the men.

      a.   Daily operation meeting did not eliminate this problem.

       b.    Besides the confusion between the 697th platoon leader and the Company C project officer, the Battalion Executive Officer and Company C Commander stayed on the project the majority of the time, resulting in four (4) officers trying to run the job. However, as the job progressed the Battalion Executive began to realize that the 697th platoon leader and platoon was capable of doing the job, in turn, the Executive Officer began to respect any recommendations made by the 697th platoon leader.

      (1)    However, approximately one (1) week before dead line day the 697th Platoon leader felt that the project was getting too disorganized because of over supervision.

      (2)    The 697th platoon leader then told the Battalion Executive Officer that the project would run and progress much better if there was not over supervision. The battalion executive officer accepted the 697th platoon leader's complaint and he had the Company C Commander sent back to his headquarters. He also put the 697th platoon leader in charge of the project, also he himself went back to his headquarters.

      c.    The critical need for this pipeline is the reason for the problems of over supervision. 44th was in continued harassment to get the pipeline completed. Misunderstanding did not result from poor officers. 44th has the highest caliber of officers. The problem was that this was considered one of the "hottest" construction projects going on in Korea at this time, as a result, everybody wanted to help.

6.    There were several obstacles incorporated into the installation of the tactical coupled phase that hampered operations.

      a.    After approximately a thousand feet of pipe had been installed, including two (2) buried road crossing, word was received from Eighth Army's G3 that no curves with radii less than 48 inches would be used. The reason was that they wanted to pump a wiper plug through the eight (8) mile line after it would be completed. As a result, all pipe would have to be heated and bent. A pipebending machine was designed, incorporating a twenty-ton jack and built by the 697th. The apparatus was quite effective, however, it was a slow process because of the numerous road curves, ox cart trails or road crossing in which eighteen (18) inch culverts were installed with the pipe running through the culverts. As a result, the initial thousand feet that was installed, did not incorporate these features therefore, had to be made several modifications.

      b.    The design of the pipeline called for supports spaced every joint of the pipe. Wooden supports were made, however, after two miles of supports were installed the local Natives found that the wooded supports was the answer to their fuel shortage. This operation was eliminated.

      c.    Indecisions on the route location caused several wasted man hours.

      (1)    The first two thousand feet of pipe installed on the Air Base had to be moved from one side of the road to the other because it was not 100 feet away from a Nitrogen Plant.

      (2)    Approximately one (1) mile of pipe on a levee had to be located on the opposite side of the road because some VIP liked it better on the other side.

      (3)    A thousand feet of pipe going through a rice field had to be moved because some rice farmer complained to Eighth Army, which stipulated that the easement had not been checked, as shown by the drawings.

7.    The 4,600 feet of welded buried pipe, also introduced problems.

      a.    The digging of the trench was the major obstacle. The trace for the buried pipe was the cutting of a three foot trench on the side of a rock road going through a heavily populated village. The reason for this route is because to the East of the road was mountainous terrain while to the West of the road was the Yellow Sea. The pipe had to be buried because of the hazardous of a tactical line in such a populated area. A 750 Barber Greene Entrenching machine was utilized, however, the encountering of rock caused several mechanical break downs. A ten ton backhoe was then brought to the project, however, the backhoe outcrops (?); such areas had to be done with jack hammers. One area, approximately 300 feet, was of solid granite as a result, pipeline was welded and installed above ground.

      b.    The welded buried portion of the pipeline had to be coated with tar, wrapped, and then recoated. Such an operation should have the proper equipment, which the pipeline platoon was not equipped. The 697th coated approximately 1000 feet then the remaining pipe was coated by Company C personnel. The results of the coating was of poor quality, but this was expected because of the means available to do the coating.

      c.    Problems with the local natives were encountered. Large crowds of native spectators would gather around the construction, exposing themselves to construction equipment. The working personnel were in constant fear of hurting someone accidentally, however, there was no incident. Vehicular traffic through the area of entrenching caused several traffic jams. This became such a problem that the digging operations was done only between 2300 hours to 0700 hours, hours in which the least traffic was encountered.

      d.    Lack of highly experienced welders presented an area of problems. Although, the 697th and 44th's Company C had several Army trained welders, the welders were not sufficiently qualified for pipeline welding. Only two men from the 697th were qualified for pipe welding. Toward the latter part of the welded portion of the pipeline, Company C did receive a qualified pipe welder that was also utilized. The welders were very critical and they were over worked. There were times when they actually put in sixteen (16) hours a day of steady welding, which is too much of a strain on them to maintain quality welds. Time was lost due to break down in welders. The 697th brought only one welding machine, the 44th furnished one also. However, there was mechanical breakdowns that deemed it necessary to borrow welding machines from the Air Force.

8.   Another perplexity that originated on the buried welded was the breaking of several water lines. Before any digging started the 697th platoon leader requested information on the probability of buried lines. Check was supposed to have been made with a negative report. After two thousand feet of digging, the ten ton backhoe ruptured a 13 inch cast iron water main serving the town of Kunsan. Eighteen hours was lost repairing this leak. Concern then aroused over this line. Investigation through several of the local natives, revealed that the pipeline was buried four (4) feet and crossed the road five times in attempts to dodge granite outcrops. Instead of waiting on a complete check of the location of the water pipe, Company C had the 697th move a thousand feet of welded pipe to the opposite side of the road, however, after it was learned that the pipeline zigzagged across the road, 44th realized that the opposite side of the road did not offer a solution. The thousand feet was then moved back to other aide. Since the waterline was buried at four (4) feet, 44th had the new line brought up to a depth of two (2) feet. Besides the 13 inch water main, several small one inch lines were damaged and had to be replaced.

9.   On 27 March 1968 the complete pipeline was ready for water testing. Water was to be pumped from a 250 BBL water tank at the Army Receiving terminal to the Air Force Base. The Army Receiving terminal had four (4) inch centrifugal pumps. Two pumps were estimated to be needed to pump the eight (8) miles. The capacity of the pipeline was approximately 70,000 gallons of water. The water source to the water tower, at the Army terminal, was connected to the Kunsan waterman in which the water was only turned on for eight (8) hours a day. The pipeline was disconnected at one (1) mile increments where it was flushed and then pressured up to 300 psi. Two (2) miles were tested in this manner, however, time was lost waiting for the tank to fill up, also only one pump was operational and difficulty in building up the pressure was encountered. About half way long the line the Air Force, had their water station. A request to the Air Force to use their pump station was approved. A line to their pump house, 100 feet away was installed. Four (4) miles of line at a time was flushed and tested to 300 psi. Delay in water testing facilities began to throw the project behind schedule by two days. Request to work all night testing the line was made by the 44th En. The 697th platoon leader asked that testing and repair of leaks be done during the hours of light so that adequate light would be available to correct the leaks, also because the repair of leaks was over an eight (8) mile span with various areas in rice fields, thus making the use of generators a problem to use. Higher command insisted to work all night. Flashlights were used. Before the line was completely satisfactory, as to leaks, the order to start pumping fuel was given. No coordination to an inspection while under water test, was made between the POL personnel, that would be operating the facility, and the construction outfit.

10.   Upon completion of the project there was confusion on what the 697th was to do. The 697th was under the impression that they were to return to their home unit in Thailand. A request for airlift was sent to the Eighth Army by the platoon leader. A reply that they were to stay in Korea for the full period of sixty (60) days was returned by Eighth Army.

11.   On 4 April 1968 the 44th Battalion Commander called the 697th platoon leader and told him to report to the Second Group Commander located at Kimpo. The Second Group Commander briefed the 697th officer on what little he knew of a two (2) mile pipeline that was to be installed at the Osan Air Base. There was still confusion on who was responsible for arranging for the transportation of the 697th to the new job location. Second Group stated that they did not have any orders attaching the 697th to them. Therefore, they felt that the 44th Bn was responsible for arranging for transportation. Upon return to Kunsan 44th was under the impression that arrangements were being made by Second Group. Transportation was then arranged by 44th En. Three days prior to the unit moving to Osan to be attached to the Company B, 802d Bn, an advance party of two Sergeants was sent to make all the necessary arrangements. The 697th platoon arrived at a Korean train station twelve miles from Osan. The 802d met the 697th platoon and transported the men to tents that had been set up for them. The 697th platoon leader then reported to the Company B Commander, however, the Commanding Officer could not see the 697th officer until the following morning because the Commanding Officer stated that he was tied up at the time. A request to the operations officer for the men to have transportation to pick up their bedding and to take them to chow was made. However, the request was denied on the grounds that it was after 1700 hours, 697th was told that the linen issue was only three blocks away and they could walk. However, Company B failed to realize that this was the first time that the unit was on base and was not familiar with the location of the facilities. The 697th platoon leader questioned his two sergeants that was sent as the advance party, as to why this had not been set up prior to the platoon's arrival, the reply was that attempts were made to set it up, but Company B personnel did not have the linen to issue. The following morning, 13 April 1968, the 697th officer discussed the project with Company B Commander. The Commanding Officer obviously had not been informed of the platoon's needs, which had been set up with Second Group's S3, because they were under the impression that the platoon had its own vehicles. The Company B Commanding Officer told the 697th officer to see if he could borrow vehicles from the Air Force, also to check with PRIME BEEF of the Air Force on what the job was about.

12.   PRIME BEEF briefed the 697th officer of the project and stated that material left from the Kunsan project would be utilized until their supplies arrived. Eighth Army had passed down to Second Group that they were to arrange for the transportation of the remaining pipe from Kunsan to Osan, however, action did not seem to be taken place, therefore the Air Force sent a lowbed that night to Kunsan to pick up a load of pipe so that the pipeline platoon could get started, while the rest of the pipe would be transported by rail, also the PRIME BEEF Commander assigned two Master Sergeants to assist the 697th in arranging the rail transportation for the pipe because Second Group had not made the arrangements prior for the railcars.

13.   Transportation was major problem at the Osan project. Company B was only able to supply one 2 1/2 ton truck. This obstacle hampered construction because three sections were working on various areas in the two mile stretch. Eighth Army's G3 became quite concerned over this problem and told 802d Bn that the pipeline was top priority and that the pipeline would get whatever support necessary. However, poor support still resulted and a complaint was made to G3 by the 697th platoon leader, after that, the 697th had no more problems with transportation.

14.   Available material hindered the installation. There were no 90's, 45's, or Tee's available initially and therefore had to be constructed, however, at the latter part of the project, after they had already been fabricated by the 697th welder, the material came in. The supply of couplins became exhausted prior to approximately two thousand feet to completing the project. Several days were lost waiting for an airlift of couplings. The 697th was scheduled to be back in Thailand not later than 4 May 1968. Concern as to how much work would be left unfinished since time was running out developed. Outlet fittings were still lacking therefore, testing of the pipeline was initiated. Water under 150 psi was utilized for testing. The pipeline was inspected by the 802d Bn Commander, PRIME BEEF Project Officer, and the Air Force POL Officers; the water test was approved by all parties.

15.   All necessary information for return airlift was submitted approximately two (2) weeks in advance. Two days before the platoon was to be airlifted, the 802d Bn, Second Group, and Eighth Army transportation started calling the 697th platoon leader, they were confused on who was to request the airlift. A complaint was made to G3. An investigation revealed that the paper work had never gone down the line. G3 then had to make a verbal request.

16.   On 3 May 1968, one of the two C130's departed at 0900 hours with the third platoon of the 697th and arrived in Korat, Thailand 0700 hours, 3 May 1968. The second C130 with one sergeant and two EM arrived with the platoon's equipment on 5 May 1968.

17.   In conclusion, the overall major problem with the Kunsan project was over supervision. The 697th platoon leader should have had more control in the construction operation. The Osan project. showed no support administratively and equipment wise until formal complaints were made to G3 of Eighth Army.

The above report was acquired at the National Archives II in College Park, MD. June 2001